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Although  intrinsic  motivations  receive  increasing  attention  in  explaining  human  actions,  our 
knowledge on their causes and effects is incomplete. Quite surprisingly, the existing literature fails 
to consider the relationship between intrinsic motivations and social capital formation. The present 
paper  increases  understanding  on  the  effect  of  intrinsic  motivations  by  studying  the  role  that 
different  motivations  to  volunteer  have  on  the  creation  of  volunteers’  social  capital  which  is 
intended as networks of cooperative relations.  
Our  empirical  analysis  considers  three  indices  of  social  capital,  aimed  at  measuring  both  the 
quantitative (number) and the qualitative (degree of familiarity and cooperation) character of social 
relations, and intrinsic and extrinsic motivations to volunteer (ideal motivations, the desire to feel 
useful  to  others,  the  pursuit  of  social  recognition  and  the  desire  to  increase  the  number  of 
acquaintances or friends).  
We find that the creation of social capital through participation in voluntary associations is not 
indifferent  to  the  motivations  which  induced  the  volunteer  to  start  his/her  unpaid  activity.  In 
particular, we show that intrinsic motivations enable people to extend their social networks by 
creating  relations  characterized  by  a  significant  degree  of  familiarity.  By  contrast,  extrinsic 
motivations, and in particular the decision to join an association in order to increase the number of 
acquaintances or friends, promote the creation of networks from a quantitative point of view, but 
they do not facilitate the creation of relations based on a particular degree of confidence. 
 
JEL classification: A13, D01, L31. 
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Why  do  people  volunteer?  What  effect  does  participation  in  voluntary  associations  have  on 
members’ social capital? What relation connects the motivation to volunteer and its effect? We 
draw on an original dataset developed by the author to investigate these three interrelated questions. 
We also stress the economic relevance and the policy implications of their answers. The paper 
differs from other studies by its analysis of the effect of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations on the 
creation of volunteers’ social capital, which is defined in terms of networks of cooperative relations. 
 
Why do people volunteer? 
We distinguish between extrinsic (though obviously non monetary) and intrinsic motivations to 
engage in volunteer work. After the seminal works by Titmuss (1970), Deci (1971, 1972, 1975), 
and  Frey  (1997)  with  respect  to  the  economic  literature,  intrinsic  motivations  have  received 
increasing attention in explaining human action. Even in standard economic environments, people 
do  not  care about  their  material  payoffs  alone  or, more in  general,  about  the  consequences  of 
actions; they also have intrinsic reasons to act (Frey and Jegen 2001). Following Deci, “one is said 
to be intrinsically motivated to perform an activity when one receives no apparent reward except the 
activity itself” (Deci 1971, P.105).
1  
Specific conditions characterizing different situations may be more (or less) congenial for intrinsic 
motivations  to  arise  (Frey  1997).  The  typical  Walrasian  market  characterized  by  anonymous 
interactions restricted to the transmission of coded information through the auctioneer’s agency 
seems  not  to  leave  room  for  intrinsic  motivations.  And  yet,  intrinsic  motivations  may  play  an 
important role in institutions characterized by personal relations and high participation in decisions. 
This is, for example, the case of nonprofit organizations (Frey and Goette 1999), where the large 
presence of volunteer work may strengthen the idea that people act because they obtain satisfaction 
from the action in itself. Obviously, volunteers may also be extrinsically motivated. Firstly, they 
may be interested in the output produced by associational activities. In this case, the voluntary 
contribution is aimed at enhancing the effect of the association’s work on its recipients (Schiff 
1990, Duncan 1999). Secondly, volunteers may desire to improve their human capital through the 
                                                              
1 The literature stresses that the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations is not always clear and that “in 
many cases, the two motivations come together” (Frey 1997, p. 14). However, we share Frey’s ideas (1997) that “for 
the  purpose  of  explaining  economically  and  socially  relevant  human  behavior,  it  suffices  that  it  makes  sense  to 
distinguish activities which individuals (mainly) do just because they like them, and others which they (mainly) do 
because they are induced to do so by monetary payment or by command.” (Frey 1997, p.14). activities  carried  out  in  the  association  (Menchik  and  Weisbrod  1987).  Thirdly  they  may  be 
attracted by the social recognition that derives from volunteering (Schiff 1990).  
Despite  the  clarity  of  the  theoretical  hypotheses,  empirical  investigations  have  not  definitively 
clarified the role of these various motivations in explaining volunteer work (Prouteau and Wolff 
2004). Our empirical analysis investigates the reason behind the decision to volunteer by explicitly 
asking unpaid workers in voluntary associations to state why they decided to start their activity. In 
particular, we distinguish between intrinsic motivations (desire to feel useful for others and ideal 
reasons) and extrinsic motivations (desire to increase the number of acquaintances or friends and 
social recognition)
2. We find that intrinsic motivations are more influential in inducing people to 
volunteer and, more importantly, we find evidence of significant differences between intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations in promoting the creation of volunteers’ social capital. 
 
What effect does participation in voluntary associations have on members? 
Several  studies  on  the  effect  of  participation  in  voluntary  associations  refer  to  notions  usually 
associated with the concept of social capital.
3 They consider the effect of voluntary participation on 
civicness  (Mayer  2003, Wollebæck and  Selle  2003),  generalized  trust  (Brehm and  Rahn  1997, 
Stolle and Rochon 1998, Claibourn and Martin 2000, Mayer 2003, Wollebæck and Selle 2003), 
trust  in  public  institutions  (Brehm  and  Rahn  1997,  Stolle  and  Rochon  1998,  Mayer  2003, 
Wollebæck  and  Selle  2003)  and  indicators  of  tolerance,  free  riding  and  optimism  (Stolle  and 
Rochon  1998).  Whilst  social  capital  understood  in  terms  of  social  norms has  been  thoroughly 
studied in relation to associational membership, this is not the case of social capital understood as a 
cooperative network of relations.
4 Contribution in this regard have been made by Wollebæck and 
Selle (2002) and Prouteau and Wolff (2004). Wollebæck and Selle consider two proxies of social 
networks. Both are computed by considering the groups outside the sphere of family and relations 
which are evaluated to be important parts of one’s social circle. In the questionnaire used by the 
                                                              
2 We assume that both the desire to feel useful for others and ideal reasons essentially concern the “inner feelings” (Frey 
1997, p.13) which may induce people to act. By contrast, both social recognition, which is usually considered an 
extrinsic  reason  to  act  (see  Frey  1997,  p.14),  and the  desire  to  increase  the  number  of  acquaintances are  clearly 
associated with extrinsic motivations. 
3 There are two main approaches to the concept of social capital. The first considers social capital in terms of civicness 
and social norms of trust and reciprocity (e.g. Putnam et al. 1993 and Knack and Keefer 1997), the second conceives 
social capital in terms of cooperative networks of relations (this is the approach followed, for example, by Coleman 
1988, 1990 and Burt 1992, 2002). 
4 To be stressed is that, at a macro level, since the seminal work by Putnam et al. (1993), associational membership in 
itself is often considered a proxy for social capital. Sabatini (2008), for example, considers the diffusion of voluntary 
organizations as a proxy for the density of cooperative networks. However, we adopt a micro approach and investigate 
the  relation  between  voluntary  participation  and  relational  networks  by  analyzing  how  participation  affects  social 
network formation.  authors, respondents were asked to check a box for each of the following 5 groups: “neighbours and 
local community where you live now,” “current colleagues or fellow students,” “former colleagues 
or fellow students,” “friends from where you grew up,” and “others.” The first measure of social 
networks is based on the number of groups that a respondent declared to be part of his/her network. 
The second proxy is a dummy variable that represents the presence or absence of “friends obtained 
in  the  current  situation”,  that  is,  either  current  colleagues,  fellow  students,  or  neighbors 
(Wollebæck and Selle 2002, p.41). According to the authors’ intention, this second indicator wants 
to measure the impact of involvement in associations on the construction of new social networks. 
Wollebæck and Selle find that membership is positively correlated with both these two proxies of 
social  networks.  Prouteau  and  Wolff  (2004)  study  the  relationship  between  consumption  of 
relational goods and participation. To this end, they analyse the correlation between associational 
participation and the number of informal meetings with friends by using data at household level. 
The authors find that the frequency of gatherings with friends per household is positively affected 
by the participation in voluntary associations by at least one of the family members.  
In this paper we improve understanding of the relationship between associational membership and 
social  network  in  three  directions.  Firstly,  we  consider  the  role  that  different  motivations  to 
volunteer  have  on  the  creation  of  social  networks  connected  to  participation  in  voluntary 
associations. We are not aware of any studies on this specific topic. Secondly, we use data at 
individual level which enable us directly to connect participation and the creation of new social 
networks and to avoid endogeneity problems (our questions are of the type: how many people met 
since joining the association do you regard as friends?). Finally, we study the effect of participation 
on social networks by looking both at the quantitative side of networks (how many people met since 
joining the association do you regard as friends?) and at the qualitative one (by considering the 
degree of familiarity characterizing the relations started through the association). This distinction 
enables us to conduct better investigation of the relationship between motivations and cooperative 
networks and their economic effect. In fact, a recent study (Degli Antoni 2008) has shown that the 
effect of social networks on economic variables (specifically individual economic welfare) can only 
be fully understood by considering also the qualitative aspect of social networks (which in Degli 
Antoni’s paper are considered by looking at the degree of satisfaction with relations) whereas the 
literature usually focuses on the quantitative element. 
 
What relation connects the motivation to volunteer and its effect in terms of social capital creation? 
Although the relationships between motivations and voluntary participation and between voluntary 
participation and social capital have been often analyzed in the economic literature, we are not aware of any studies specifically focused on the link between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations to 
volunteer  and  the  creation  of  social  capital.  At  least  from  an  empirical  point  of  view,  this  is 
probably due to a lack of data with which to conduct this kind of analysis. This paper uses an 
original database collected by the author, which will be described in more detail below, to address 
this issue econometrically. It will be shown that social capital formation is significantly affected by 
the kind of motivation inducing the volunteer to join the association. The creation of cooperative 
relational  networks  is  fostered  by  participation  in  voluntary  associations  more  for  intrinsically 
motivated  volunteers  than  for  extrinsically  ones.
5  The  economic  significance  of  the  paper  is 
twofold.  Firstly,  it  increases  knowledge  about  the  determinants  of  social  capital,  which  is 
substantially  recognized  as  having  major  effects  on  the  economic  system.  It  is  not  the  mere 
participation in voluntary associations which generates cooperative networks of relations; essential 
for  these  to  come  about  is  the  role  of  intrinsic  motivations  (and  consequently  the  ability  of 
individual associations and of society as a whole to stimulate these attitudes rather than crowding 
them out
6). Secondly, the present paper contributes to the literature on intrinsic motivations by 
stressing a previously unknown effect of this reason to act on social capital formation. 
Section 2 presents the database, the social capital and the motivation indices considered in the 
empirical analysis. Section 3 sets out the empirical results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  Database: social capital and motivation indices. 
 
Database 
The present analysis is based on an original database collected at the end of 2007 by the author by 
means  of  anonymous  questionnaires  filled  in  by  290  volunteers  of  45  voluntary  associations 
operating in Parma (the ninth Italian province in terms of number of voluntary associations per 
inhabitants, with 7.3 voluntary associations per 10,000 inhabitants, ISTAT, 2003).
7 The sample of 
associations  was  a  stratified  random  sample  representing  10%  of  associations  operating  in  the 
                                                              
5 This result is rather surprising and interesting if we consider that one of the extrinsic motivations to participate is the 
desire to increase the number of acquaintances or friends. 
6 Outside interferences via monetary incentives or regulations may both crowd in and crowd out intrinsic motivations 
(Frey 1997). The literature on the motivation crowding-out effect analyses the reasons why external intervention via 
monetary payments or regulations may undermine intrinsic motivation. The crowding out effect may be attributed to 
three psychological processes: Impaired Self-Determination, Impaired Self-Esteem and Impaired Expression Possibility 
(Frey 1997, pp.16-17). For a survey of empirical evidence on the motivation crowding theory see Frey and Jegen 
(2001). 
7 In 1991, law no. 266 regulated voluntary associations in Italy by providing that, in order to access public grants and to 
benefit from tax relief, they must be characterized by solidarity aims and a democratic structure and their members must 
be for the most part voluntary workers. In this paper we focus only on associations which fulfil these criteria and which 
are consequently registered in the public registers of voluntary associations. province. The strata referred to the association’s activity
8 and to the district in which it operated.
9 
The  number  of  volunteers  per  association  was  6.4  on  average  (minimum  2,  maximum  11  and 
standard  deviation  2.4).  The  290  volunteers  were  randomly  selected  among  the  associations’ 
members and they completed a structured questionnaire consisted of 64 questions relative to their 
experiences as volunteers.  Compilation of  the  questionnaire lasted on average 45 minutes. Our 
database also contains the data from structured questionnaires (one for each association) consisted 
of 54 questions filled in by presidents or, alternatively, by volunteers with detailed knowledge on 
the  association.  These  answered  questions  intended  to  investigate  the  characteristics  of  the 
associations  in  terms  of  size,  year  of  foundation,  operational characteristics  etc.  The  variables 
constructed by means of these questions concerned the organizational level and assumed the same 
value  for  each  volunteer  belonging  to  the  same  association.  In  ten  cases  the  presidents  of  the 
associations completed both the questionnaire on the association and the questionnaire on their 
experience as volunteers. For this reason, in our empirical analysis we used a dummy which takes 
the value of 1 for these 10 subjects. 
 
Social capital indices 
We considered three proxies for social capital. The first one (named network_increase) measured 
the impact of participation on the increase in the member’s social network. It was developed from 
the  question:  “As  a  whole,  how  many  people  met  since  joining  the  association  are  now  your 
friends?”.  The  second  and  third  social  capital  proxies  took  explicit  account  of  the  degree  of 
familiarity  characterizing  the  relations  formed  through  the  association.  The  proxy  named 
higher_familiarity was the standardized
10 value mean of the 4 answers to the following questions 
for each respondent: “How many people met through the association would you 
1.  talk to about family problems?  
2.  trust to look after your relatives (children/elderly persons)? 
3.  ask to take care of your home when you are on holiday? 
                                                              
8 Seven activities are undertaken by the associations operating in Parma: Assistance, Health, Environmental and animal 
conservation, Recreation and culture, Civil defence, Education, Civil rights promotion and preservation. We decided to 
stratify the sample by considering the activities because volunteers’ motivation may significantly change in relation to 
the activity of the association. 
  Parma province is divided into four administrative districts which vary a lot for population density. In order to have all 
the districts represented in our sample we decided to stratify the sample according to the four districts. 
10  This  proxy  (and  also  the  proxy  lower_familiarity)  was  standardized  with  the  following  procedure: 








  where: ic x   indicates  the  value  i  related  to  the  association  c.  The  standardization  process 
generates standardized indicators with the same range of variation between 0 to 1, and it produces a more robust trial in 
the presence of outliers (Saisana and Tarantola 2002, p.11), which seem to characterize our indicators.  4.  give/ask for help in activities such as shopping, taking a child or elderly persons to do 
different activities, etc.?”. 
The  proxy  named  lower_familiarity  was  the  standardized  value  mean  of  the  3  answers  to  the 
question: “With  how  many  people  met  through  the  association  have  you  started  the  following 
cooperative relations: 
1.  phone calls to ask for information or advice? 
2.  doing not very demanding errands? 
3.  asking for information about job opportunities?”
11 
The aggregation into two synthetic indices of social capital of the single indicators is justified by 
their high degree of correlation (see appendix 2). 
All three proxies referred to the notion of social capital conceived as a network of cooperative 
relations. However, they measured different aspects of social networks by considering not only their 
magnitude but also the degree of familiarity characterizing the network’s connections.  
 
Motivations  
Although volunteers may not be motivated by monetary incentives, it cannot be ruled out that their 
decision  to  join  a  voluntary  association  was  prompted  by  other  extrinsic  motivations.  We 
considered two extrinsic motivations to volunteer: a desire to increase the social recognition which 
is usually associated with volunteerism (Schiff 1990) and the desire to increase the number of 
acquaintances or friends (Prouteau and Wolff 2004). With respect to the intrinsic motivations to 
volunteer, we considered the desire to feel useful for others and ideal motivations.  
Extrinsic  and  intrinsic  motivations  were  measured  by  asking  subjects:  “With  respect  to  your 
decision to become a volunteer, how important were the following aspects, from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(entirely)? 
•  the  desire  to  increase  your  number  of  acquaintances  or  friends  (variable  named 
Mot_network) 
•  the pursuit of social recognition (Mot_socialrecognition) 
•  ideal motivations (Mot_ideal) 
•  the desire to feel useful for others (Mot_usefulness)” 
In  the  empirical  analysis  we  consider  both  the  single  answers  and  two  indices  developed  by 
computing  the arithmetic  mean for  each  respondent  of the  replies  relative  to  the  extrinsic and 
                                                              
11 The activities considered in the higher_familiarity index directly concern the family circle and consequently imply a 
higher degree of confidence than those considered in the lower_familiarity index. intrinsic  motivations  respectively.  The  two  aggregate  indices  are  named  Mot_exctrinsic  and 
Mot_intrinsic. 
 
3.1 Descriptive findings 
Descriptive  statistics  show  that  participation  positively  affects  social  networks  of  cooperative 
relations. The average of persons met through the association who have become part of the social 
network of volunteers (variable network_increase) is equal to 7.48 (std.dev. 9.76; min 0; max 50),
12 
and 76.90% of respondents declared a number greater than 0.  
Tables 1 and 2 show the summary statistics for the indicators used to construct the social capital 
indices  named  higher_familiarity  and  lower_familiarity.
13  Thanks  to  their  participation  in  the 
association, at least 50% of respondents formed, at least with 1 person, the cooperative relationships 
listed in tables 1 and 2. Note that the lowest median concerns cooperation related to help with 
activities such as taking a child to do different activities etc., while the highest median concerns the 
relation  which  presumably  involves  the  lowest  degree  of  familiarity  (phone  calls  to  ask  for 
information or advice).  
INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 
In regard to the motivations inducing the decision to become a volunteer, intrinsic motivations seem 
to  be  much  more  important  than  extrinsic motivations  in  explaining  the  decision  to engage  in 
volunteer work (Fig.1). 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
The desire to feel useful for others is the factor that most affects the decision to become a volunteer, 
while the pursuit of social recognition is the least important one. The desire to increase the number 
of acquaintances or friends matters more than the pursuit of social recognition, but much less so 
than the intrinsic motivations. 
The next section reports an econometric analysis on the relationship between motivation and social 





                                                              
12 The mean calculation did not include the 7 highest values declared by respondents, which ranged from 90 to 400. If 
these outliers are included, the mean is equal to 11.96 (std. dev. 34.31) and the median is 4.  
   The correlation between these two indices is equal to 0.86 (significant at 1%.). 3.2 Econometric findings 
The empirical analysis used OLS estimates. In all the regressions we clustered standard errors by 
considering to which associations the volunteers belonged. We assumed that the observations were 
independent across groups, but not necessarily between groups (volunteers belonging to the same 
association). 
Table  3  shows  the  results  relative  to  the  index  of  social  capital  capturing  the  relations  started 
through associations characterized by a high degree of familiarity (higher_familiarity). Equation 1 
considers the aggregate indices Mot_intrinsic and Mot_extrinsic. Equation 2 comprises all the four 
single motivations to start volunteer work, and equations 3,4,5 and 6 consider the motivations one 
by one. All the equations include
14  
•  dummies  which  take  account  of:  the  association’s  activity  (Assistance,  Civil  rights 
promotion and preservation, Education, Recreation and culture, Health, Environmental and 
animal  conservation),  the  district  in  which  the  association  operated  (District_dummy1, 
District_dummy2,  District_dummy3)  and  the  fact  that  in  ten  cases  the  presidents  of  the 
associations filled in both the questionnaire on the association and the questionnaire on their 
experience as volunteers (President_dummy); 
•  control variables measured at an individual level: Age_vol: volunteer’s age; Female: dummy 
which takes the value of 1 if the volunteer is a female; Education_vol: education of the 
volunteer, from 1 (no school) to 7 (postgraduate degree); Employed: dummy which takes the 
value of 1 if the volunteer is employed; Months_in _ass: number of months the volunteer 
has worked for the association; Hour_per_week: number of hours per week devoted to the 
association by the volunteer; 
•  control variables measured at associational level: Volunteers: number of the association’s 
volunteers; Inactive members: number of the association’s members who do not actively 
participate  in  the  association;  Workers:  number  of  the  association’s  paid  workers; 
Recipients: number of recipients of the association’s services; Age_association: numbers of 
years in operation; Area: association’s area of activity that varies from the city (value 1) to 
the international level (value 6); Awareness-raising meetings: how often discussion groups 
aimed  at  raising  members’  awareness  of  collective  problems  are  organized  by  the 
association, from 1 (never) to 6 (every week); Meetings: how often informal meetings to 
discuss the association’s activity are organized by the association, from 1 (never) to 6 (every 
week). 
                                                              
14 All the descriptive statistics of regressors are in the statistical appendix. INSERT TABLE 3 
The  estimates  show  that  intrinsic  motivations  to  volunteer  positively  affect  the  formation  of 
relational networks involving the volunteer and people met through the association characterized by 
a high degree of familiarity. In particular, the more robust effect seems to be the one generated by 
ideal  motivations.  From  a  quantitative  point  of  view,  when Mot_ideal  increases  by  a  standard 
deviation, the effect on higher_familiarity is an increase of 0.111 in the standard deviation (equation 
2). Extrinsic motivations do not affect the social capital index named higher_familiarity. 
Other variables which positively affect the higher_familiarity dependent variable are: the age of the 
volunteer, the numbers of years the association has been in operation, the frequency of discussion 
groups, and the number of the association’s recipients. In particular, the last two variables may 
affect the formation of social capital by increasing the opportunity to meet other people during the 
volunteer  activity.  All  the  association’s  activity  dummies  are  statistically  significant,  while  the 
district dummies are not. 
Table 4 studies the effect of the same independent variables included in table 3 on the variable 
lower_familiarity. The numbers of the association’s years of activity and its number of recipients 
positively affect the dependent variable, which also assumes higher value for men than for women. 
Moreover, intrinsic motivations – both the ideal motivations and the desire to feel useful for others 
– seem to be robust in explaining the creation of social networks measured by the social capital 
index named lower_familiarity. The coefficient magnitude of the intrinsic motivations index implies 
that the increase of standard deviation in Mot_intrinsic increases the lower_familiarity index of 
0.320 standard deviation (equation 1). 
INSERT TABLE 4 
The social capital indices analyzed in table 3 and 4 measure the quality of networks created by 
volunteers through the association by considering the kind of activity characterizing the network’s 
relations. The dependent variable of table 5 focuses on the quantitative aspect of social networks 
simply  by  considering  the  number  of  persons  met  since  joining  the  association  whom  the 
respondent reports as friends. This variable does not give any idea of the degree of familiarity of the 
relations, but it gives a clear idea of the quantitative impact of volunteering on the social networks 
of volunteers. The results of table 5 with respect to the effect of motivation on social networks are 
ambiguous. If we look at the two aggregate indices of motivation, extrinsic motivations seem to 
prevail. However, when we include the single motivations in the regression we find that both ideal 
motivations and the desire to increase the number of acquaintances or friends positively affect the creation  of  social  networks  at  a  quantitative  level.  This  result  suggests  interesting  insights. 
Probably, extrinsic motivations, and in particular the decision to join an association in order to 
increase  the  number  of  acquaintances  or  friends,  promote  the  creation  of  networks  from  a 
quantitative point of view but they do not facilitate the creation of relations based on a particular 
degree  of  familiarity  (tables  3  and  4).  We  may  say  that  people  who  join  associations  for 
instrumental reasons achieve their aim because they increase their social network, but they are 
unable to make their new acquaintances part of their more close and familiar friends. 
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
4.  Conclusions 
Although  intrinsic  motivations  receive  increasing  attention  in  explaining  human  actions,  our 
knowledge on their causes and effects is incomplete. The present paper aimed at increasing the 
understanding  of  these  relationships  by  illustrating  a  hitherto  undiscovered  effect  of  intrinsic 
motivations. It shows that creation of volunteers’ social capital is significantly affected by the kind 
of  motivations  inducing  the  volunteers  to  join  their  associations.  We  found  that  intrinsic 
motivations enable people to extend their social networks by creating relations characterized by a 
significant degree of familiarity. By contrast, extrinsic motivations, and in particular the decision to 
join an association in order to increase the number of acquaintances or friends, promote the creation 
of networks from a quantitative point of view, but they do not facilitate the creation of relations 
based on a particular degree of confidence.  
Besides  adding  to  knowledge  on  intrinsic  motivations,  the  paper  enriches  the  social  capital 
literature. In fact, whilst associations are often considered a proxy for the density of social networks 
at a macro level, too few studies analyze the effect of associational participation on relational social 
networks  at  a  micro  level  and  they  do  not  investigate  the  role  of  motivations  to  volunteer  in 
promoting social capital creation. 
Our findings generate questions and ideas for further research. We have not investigated either the 
determinants of intrinsic motivations to volunteer or the relation between intrinsic motivations and 
operational characteristics of associations. Suitable actions implemented by voluntary associations 
which promote intrinsic motivations to volunteer may increase membership in associations as well 
as the creation of social capital. By contrast, incentives which crowd out intrinsic motivations of 
volunteers  may  produce  a  negative  effect  on  the  creation  of  cooperative  networks  of  relations 
generated through the participation in voluntary associations 
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 Table 1 How many people met through the association would you: 
  Obs.  Mean  Min  Max  Std.Dev  Median 
talk to about family problems?  270  5.26  0  100  9.66  2 
trust  to  look  after  your  relatives  (children/elderly 
persons)? 
266  3.24  0  100  7.21  1 
ask  to  take  care  of  your  home  while  you  are  on 
holiday? 
264  2.88  0  100  7.38  1 
give/ask  for  help  in  activities  such  as  shopping, 
taking  a  child  or  elderly  persons  to  do  different 
activities, etc.? 
262  3.16  0  50  1  0.5 
 
 
Tab.2 With how many people met through the association have you started  
the following cooperative relations: 
  Obs.  Mean   Min  Max  Std.Dev.  Median 
phone  calls  to  ask  for  information  or 
advice? 
263  5.05  0  50  7.39  3 
doing not very demanding errands?  262  3.55  0  50  6.37  1 
asking  for  information  about  job 
opportunities? 














 Tab.3  Motivations and creation of relational networks characterized by a higher degree of  
familiarity  
Equation  1 (OLS)  2(OLS)  3(OLS)  4(OLS)  5(OLS)  6(OLS) 
  Dependent variable: higher_familiarity 
Age_vol  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.000 
  (0.000)
   (0.000)
   (0.000)
   (0.000)  (0.000)
    (0.000) 
Female  -0.012  -0.011  -0.013  -0.010  -0.012  -0.011 
  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Education_vol  -0.002  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Employed  0.005  0.008  0.005  0.008  0.004  0.004 
  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.010) 
Months_in _ass  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Hour_per_week  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Volunteers  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Inactive members  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Workers  -0.006  -0.005  -0.006  -0.006  -0.005  -0.004 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Recipients  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)
     (0.000)
     (0.000)
    (0.000)
     (0.000)
    (0.000)
   
Age_association  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (0.001)
   (0.001)
   (0.001)
    (0.000)
   (0.001)
    (0.001)
   
Area  -0.002  -0.003  -0.002  -0.001  0.000  -0.002 
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Awareness-raising 
meetings  0.016  0.017  0.015  0.014  0.016  0.017 
  (0.004)
     (0.004)
     (0.004)
     (0.004)
     (0.004)
     (0.004)
    
Meetings  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.001  0.001  0.002 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
President_dummy  0.008  0.006  0.000  0.000  0.006  0.008 
  (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.023)  (0.021) 
Mot_intrinsic  0.009           
  (0.004)
             
Mot_ exctrinsic  0.002           
  (0.003)           
Mot_ideal    0.004  0.005       
    (0.002)
   (0.002)
         
Mot_ usefulness    0.006    0.008     
    (0.005)    (0.004)
     
Mot_network    -0.001      0.002   
    (0.004)      (0.003)   
Mot_socialrecognition    0.003        0.003 
    (0.004)        (0.003) 
Constant  -0.232  -0.242  -0.212  -0.191  -0.194  -0.203 
  (0.051)  (0.062)  (0.048)  (0.054)  (0.047)  (0.063) 
R
2  0.319  0.325  0.299  0.304  0.283  0.294 
Root MSE  0.052  0.052  0.052  0.051  0.053  0.052 
Obs  165  165  168  170  168  166 
All estimates include dummies which take account of: the association’s activity and the district in which the association 
operated (see appendix 3 for coefficients of these dummy variables). Robust standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Tab.4  Motivations and creation of relational networks characterized by a lower degree of  
familiarity  
Equation  1 (OLS)  2(OLS)  3(OLS)  4(OLS)  5(OLS)  6(OLS) 
  Dependent variable: lower_familiarity 
Age_vol  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Female  -0.024  -0.024  -0.027  -0.021  -0.025  -0.024 
  (0.011)
    (0.012)
    (0.011)
    (0.012)
   (0.012)
    (0.012)
  
Education  0.003  0.003  0.001  0.002  0.004  0.004 
  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.007) 
Employed  0.012  0.014  0.008  0.015  0.005  0.010 
  (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Years_in _ass  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Hour_per_week  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Volunteers  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Inactive members  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Workers  -0.007  -0.006  -0.008  -0.008  -0.007  -0.004 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
Recipients  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)
    (0.000)
    (0.000)
   (0.000)
     (0.000)
    (0.000)
  
Age_association  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (0.001)  (0.001)
   (0.001)
   (0.001)
   (0.001)
   (0.001)
  
Area  0.002  0.001  0.003  0.005  0.005  0.003 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Awareness-raising 
meetings  0.010  0.011  0.009  0.008  0.010  0.014 
  (0.005)
   (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007)
   
Meetings  0.010  0.011  0.011  0.007  0.007  0.008 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)
   (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
President_dummy  0.027  0.027  0.015  0.012  0.028  0.029 
  (0.030)  (0.027)  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.028) 
Mot_intrinsic  0.018           
  (0.007)
             
Mot_ exctrinsic  0.006           
  (0.007)           
Mot_ideal    0.009  0.012       
    (0.003)
     (0.003)
          
Mot_ usefulness    0.009    0.014     
    (0.009)    (0.008)
      
Mot_network    0.001      0.005   
    (0.006)      (0.005)   
Mot_socialrecognition    0.006        0.007 
    (0.007)        (0.006) 
Constant  -0.301  -0.311  -0.241  -0.210  -0.208  -0.232 
  (0.086)  (0.106)  (0.077)  (0.092)  (0.066)  (0.099) 
R
2  0.276  0.278  0.249  0.242  0.227  0.235 
Root MSE  0.088  0.088  0.088  0.088  0.090  0.090 
Obs  164  164  167  169  167  165 
All estimates include dummies which take account of: the association’s activity and the district in which the association 
operated (see appendix 3 for coefficients of these dummy variables). Robust standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Tab.5  Motivations and creation of relational networks from a quantitative point of view 
Equation  1 (OLS)  2(OLS)  3(OLS)  4(OLS)  5(OLS)  6(OLS) 
  Dependent variable: network_increase 
Age_vol  0.022  0.052  -0.058  -0.058  0.026  -0.018 
  (0.150)  (0.149)  (0.144)  (0.149)  (0.132)  (0.148) 
Female  4.990  4.203  4.668  5.136  4.893  4.469 
  (6.755)  (6.401)  (6.773)  (6.931)  (6.447)  (6.720) 
Education  0.570  0.217  -1.102  -0.623  0.184  0.027 
  (1.914)  (1.768)  (1.374)  (1.375)  (1.545)  (1.876) 
Employed  -3.798  -5.381  -5.508  -4.701  -5.766  -3.653 
  (4.067  (4.685)  (5.106)  (5.420)  (3.530)  (4.410) 
Years_in _ass  0.078  0.080  0.065  0.067  0.082  0.070 
  (0.037)
    (0.036)
    (0.038)
   (0.038)
    (0.035)
    (0.040)
  
Hour_per_week  1.737  1.788  1.901  1.836  1.693  1.755 
  (1.101)  (1.126)  (1.209)  (1.194)  (1.107)  (1.110) 
Volunteers  -0.072  -0.054  -0.018  -0.032  -0.026  -0.105 
  (0.095)  (0.098)  (0.095)  (0.087)  (0.097)  (0.092) 
Inactive members  -0.001  -0.003  -0.004  -0.003  -0.004  0.001 
  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Workers  1.138  0.792  0.055  0.200  0.030  1.726 
  (1.366)  (1.483)  (1.332)  (1.295)  (1.396)  (1.371) 
Recipients  -0.009  -0.010  -0.008  -0.007  -0.007  -0.010 
  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Age_association  0.542  0.574  0.499  0.560  0.581  0.661 
  (0.247)
    (0.256)
    (0.223)
    (0.225)
   (0.233)
    (0.226)
    
Area  -1.104  -1.114  -0.865  -0.724  -0.901  -1.425 
  (1.345)  (1.606)  (1.281)  (1.359)  (1.359)  (1.596) 
Awareness-raising 
meetings  4.110  3.823  3.399  4.138  4.021  5.368 
  (2.356)
   (2.348)  (2.525)  (2.595)  (2.666)  (2.262)
   
Meetings  -0.383  -0.101  -0.113  -0.974  -1.194  -0.561 
  (2.101)  (2.211)  (2.385)  (2.411)  (2.256)  (2.154) 
President_dummy  66.545  67.822  57.525  56.797  67.782  67.057 
  (46.521)  (46.363)  (42.783)  (43.141)  (46.795)  (46.587) 
Mot_intrinsic  1.348           
  (1.479)           
Mot_ exctrinsic  4.062           
  (1.893)
             
Mot_ideal    1.965  2.471       
    (0.930)
    (1.026)
         
Mot_ usefulness    -1.363    0.453     
    (1.729)    (1.805)     
Mot_network    2.460      3.015   
    (1.272)
       (1.120)
     
Mot_socialrecognition    1.472        2.448 
    (2.126)        (1.979) 
Constant  -115.728  -112.389  -90.313  -84.426  -102.941  -105.603 
  (25.135)  (29.075)  (19.795)  (20.225)  (19.471)  (29.178) 
R
2  0.408  0.414  0.364  0.355  0.403  0.393 
Root MSE  30.325  30.398  30.697  30.842  30.074  30.521 
Obs  163  163  169  170  166  164 
All estimates include dummies which take account of: the association’s activity and the district in which the association 
operated (see appendix 3 for coefficients of these dummy variables). Robust standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Fig 1  With respect to your decision to become a volunteer, how important were the following  


















 Appendix 1 - Statistical appendix 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Higher_familiarity  261  0.045  0.080  0  1 
Lower_familiarity  260  0.075  0.107  0  0.867 
Network_increase  269  11.959  34.313  0  400 
Age_vol  281  48.986  16.152  16  86 
Female  288  0.528  0.500  0  1 
Education  286  4.395  1.343  2  7 
Employed  290  0.652  0.477  0  1 
Years_in _ass  255  93.184  84.583  0  491 
Hour_per_week  276  6.228  6.710  0  40 
Volunteers  280  54.604  85.525  2  350 
Inactive members  290  561.269  1221.271  0  5500 
Workers  283  1.028  2.924  0  14 
Recipients  241  199.681  395.144  0  2000 
Age_association  278  20.745  14.076  1  81 
Area  283  2.954  1.623  1  6 
Awareness-raising 
meetings  286  3.476  1.562  1  6 
Meetings  286  4.070  1.466  1  6 
District_dummy1  290  0.255  0.437  0  1 
District_dummy2  290  0.390  0.489  0  1 
District_dummy3  290  0.131  0.338  0  1 
Assistance  290  0.293  0.456  0  1 
Civil right promotion 
and preservation  290  0.103  0.305  0  1 
Education  290  0.093  0.291  0  1 
Recreation and 
culture  290  0.062  0.242  0  1 
Health  290  0.355  0.479  0  1 
Environmental and 
animal conservation  290  0.086  0.281  0  1 
President_dummy  290  0.034  0.183  0  1 
Mot_intrinsic  263  5.711  1.149  1  7 
Mot_ exctrinsic  255  2.992  1.533  1  7 
Mot_ideal  268  5.537  1.736  1  7 
Mot_ usefulness  274  5.894  1.334  1  7 
Mot_network  265  3.619  1.997  1  7 








 Appendix 2 - Correlation among social capital simple indicators 
Correlation matrix of indicators used for the index higher-familiarity  
How  many  of  the  people  you 
have  met  through  the 
association would you: 
talk  to  about 
family problems 




ask to take care of 
your  home  during 
holidays 
give/ask  for  help 
with  activities 
such  as  taking 
children  to  do 
different activities, 
etc. 
talk to about family problems  1       
entrust  with  relatives 
(children/elderly persons) 
0.813*
  1     
ask to take care of your home 
during holidays 
0.744*  0.905*  1   
give/ask for help with activities 
such  as  taking  children  to  do 
different activities, etc. 
0.523*  0.617*  0.595*  1 
*Significant at 1%. 
 
Correlation matrix of indicators used for the index lower-familiarity 
With  how  many  people  met  through  the 
association  have  you    started  the  following 
cooperative relations: 
phone  calls  to  ask 
for  information  or 
advice 
doing  not  very 
demanding errands 
asking  for 
information  about 
job opportunities 
phone calls to ask for information or advice  1     
doing not very demanding errands  0.708*  1   
asking for information about job opportunities  0.641*  0.418*  1 











 Appendix 3 – Coefficients of dummy variables included in Tables 3,4 and 5. 
Coefficients of dummy variables included in Table 3 
Equation  1 (OLS)  2(OLS)  3(OLS)  4(OLS)  5(OLS)  6(OLS) 
  Dependent variable: network_increase 
District_dummy1  -13.033  -13.671  -6.527  -5.958  -10.918  -14.880 
  (7.969)  (8.521)  (7.650)  (7.373)  (7.336)  (8.441)
  
District_dummy2  2.377  2.162  5.516  4.625  2.872  1.245 
  (6.604)  (6.602)  (7.957)  (7.904)  (6.539)  (6.836) 
District_dummy3  2.313  1.240  3.466  6.732  4.234  4.888 
  (9.070)  (8.895)  (9.451)  (9.990)  (8.671)  (8.937) 
Assistance  66.336  69.776  58.428  60.205  67.814  70.251 
  (16.053)
     (16.565)
     (14.204)
     (14.234)
     (14.756)
     (16.006)
    
Civil right promotion 
and preservation  72.267  70.406  61.209  65.966  69.679  79.839 
  (16.808)
     (18.598)
     (15.866)
     (15.222)
     (16.871)
     (16.993)
    
Education  85.633  88.926  79.381  80.343  85.882  93.586 
  (15.075)
     (16.639)
     (13.593)
     (14.079)
     (15.215)
     (15.286)
    
Recreation and 
culture  70.816  72.380  60.022  63.502  71.927  77.437 
  (19.646)
     (19.994)
     (19.727)
     (19.594)
     (20.454)
     (19.555)
    
Health  67.135  70.942  58.614  58.650  66.778  72.110 
  (12.448)
     (13.845)
     (11.503)
     (12.221)
     (12.286)
     (12.930)
    
Environmental and 
animal conservation  55.803  54.972  47.668  51.814  60.664  56.360 
  (15.538)
     (16.189)
     (16.205)
     (16.230)
     (15.614)
     (16.319)
    
Robust standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Coefficients of dummy variables included in Table 4 
Equation  1 (OLS)  2(OLS)  3(OLS)  4(OLS)  5(OLS)  6(OLS) 
  Dependent variable: lower_familiarity 
District_dummy1  -0.076  -0.078  -0.073  -0.069  -0.072  -0.080 
  (0.027)
     (0.029)
    (0.026)
     (0.026)
    (0.028)
    (0.031)
   
District_dummy2  -0.035  -0.034  -0.040
   -0.041  -0.044  -0.042 
  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.028) 
District_dummy3  -0.046  -0.043  -0.047  -0.045  -0.039  -0.034 
  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.028)  (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.035) 
Assistance  0.136  0.138  0.143  0.113  0.155  0.162 
  (0.052)
    (0.054)
    (0.048)
     (0.052)
    (0.051)
     (0.057)
    
Civil right promotion 
and preservation  0.153  0.162  0.144  0.142  0.160  0.185 
  (0.053)
     (0.061)
    (0.051)
     (0.049)
     (0.053)
     (0.064)
    
Education  0.141  0.149  0.152  0.115  0.150  0.175 
  (0.049)
     (0.050)
     (0.047)
     (0.049)
    (0.051)
     (0.056)
    
Recreation and 
culture  0.178  0.181  0.183  0.152  0.196  0.208 
  (0.064)
     (0.070)
    (0.067)
    (0.063)
    (0.071)
     (0.084)
   
Health  0.158  0.164  0.163  0.118  0.158  0.174 
  (0.044)
     (0.046)
     (0.041)
     (0.044)
    (0.045)
     (0.053)
    
Environmental and 
animal conservation  0.151  0.148  0.138  0.148  0.158  0.150 
  (0.054)
     (0.057)
    (0.054)
    (0.053)
     (0.053)
     (0.055)
    
Robust standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Coefficients of dummy variables included in Table 5 
Equation  1 (OLS)  2(OLS)  3(OLS)  4(OLS)  5(OLS)  6(OLS) 
  Dependent variable: network_increase 
District_dummy1  -13.033  -13.671  -6.527  -5.958  -10.918  -14.880 
  (7.969)  (8.521)  (7.650)  (7.373)  (7.336)  (8.441)
  
District_dummy2  2.377  2.162  5.516  4.625  2.872  1.245 
  (6.604)  (6.602)  (7.957)  (7.904)  (6.539)  (6.836) 
District_dummy3  2.313  1.240  3.466  6.732  4.234  4.888 
  (9.070)  (8.895)  (9.451)  (9.990)  (8.671)  (8.937) 
Assistance  66.336  69.776  58.428  60.205  67.814  70.251 
  (16.053)
     (16.565)
     (14.204)
     (14.234)
     (14.756)
     (16.006)
    
Civil right promotion 
and preservation  72.267  70.406  61.209  65.966  69.679  79.839 
  (16.808)
     (18.598)
     (15.866)
     (15.222)
     (16.871)
     (16.993)
    
Education  85.633  88.926  79.381  80.343  85.882  93.586 
  (15.075)
     (16.639)
     (13.593)
     (14.079)
     (15.215)
     (15.286)
    
Recreation and 
culture  70.816  72.380  60.022  63.502  71.927  77.437 
  (19.646)
     (19.994)
     (19.727)
     (19.594)
     (20.454)
     (19.555)
    
Health  67.135  70.942  58.614  58.650  66.778  72.110 
  (12.448)
     (13.845)
     (11.503)
     (12.221)
     (12.286)
     (12.930)
    
Environmental and 
animal conservation  55.803  54.972  47.668  51.814  60.664  56.360 
  (15.538)
     (16.189)
     (16.205)
     (16.230)
     (15.614)
     (16.319)
    
Robust standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 